[786] seems to me to require comparison on an artificial plane of concepts difficult to define in the abstract. There is valuable material in this first chapter, but it appears out of place. Secondly, I disfavor the use in such a course as this of the time-consuming teaching vehicle of the earlier English cases. However, these questions are perhaps comparatively unimportant. There is ample material in this able book for a course on Trusts, and individual instructors can make such rearrangements as they desire.
There is a more important issue. I definitely disagree with the basic assumption that a separate course on "Trusts" is desirable, and propose to experiment with the contrary hypothesis. The great diversity and scope of the decisions employing trust language are familiar, and a major and highly controversial problem of classification for curricular and other 2 purposes is presented. Any very intelligible discussion would require much greater elaboration than seems appropriate here. An attempt will be made, however, to suggest some of the reasons for a change. We are primarily interested in the actual results of judicial action in given situations, and it therefore seems that all available factors relevant to a particular prediction or inquiry should be considered at the same time. The existing arrangement seems to prohibit that and to make incomplete the consideration of particular issues both in the Trusts course and in others. In other words, the basis for curricular classification should be the situation rather than the legal concept. A peculiarly convenient general situation on which to focus is that of gratuitous non-commercial disposition of wealth. It involves closely related legal techniques, and no great upheaval in the curriculum at large need be occasioned. Such a change of emphasis would also make it possible to condense the present Wills material and merge it with materials of higher intellectual content. And I do not believe that an adequate appreciation by the student of the broad existing and potential utility of the trust device need be lost in the process. Signs of unrest with the existing order of things are apparent elsewhere. Mr. Carey's recent casebook is an example. And the proposals referred to here are probably harmonious with some of the hypotheses underlying Mr. Richard Powell's developments at Columbia; the tentative arrangement, however, is understood to be quite different. I would favor including in one course the substantive law of intestate succession, outright gifts, wills, and that large part of the existing course on Trusts that concerns gratuitous transfers; and in another and separate course the problems that arise in the management of decedent and trust estates by executors, administrators and trustees. No change in the course on Future Interests is suggested.
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